Galveston Defense Attorneys Signal They Won’t Fight Sur-Reply That Weaponizes Their Own Admission

Galveston Defense Attorneys Signal They Won’t Fight Sur-Reply That Weaponizes Their Own Admission

Filed June 11, 2026 — Reardon v. Osteen et al., No. 3:25-CV-203 (S.D. Tex., Galveston Div.) GALVESTON, TX — Before plaintiff Matthew Oliver Reardon even filed his motion for leave to file a sur-reply, attorneys for the City of Galveston signaled via email that their clients would not oppose it. Hours later, the sur-reply landed — and it may be the most consequential filing in the case to date. Defense counsel Norman Ray Giles — a Partner and Vice Chair of the Civil Rights & Police Defense Litigation Practice at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP — representing the City of Galveston, Officer William Osteen, and Sergeant Jack Doraty — responded via email to plaintiff’s service notification: “You are welcome to include in your motion that my clients do not oppose your motion to file a sur-reply.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply formally states that defendants do not oppose the filing — as authorized by Giles’s email. The motion was filed alongside the proposed sur-reply itself, meaning the court now has both: a motion that announces the defense will not contest it, and a 15-page sur-reply that seizes on paragraph 14 of the defendants’ own reply — where those same attorneys admitted that Osteen “expressly stated on the recordings that he did not smell alcohol on the Plaintiff’s breath.” Together, the two filings present the court with an unopposed brief that turns the defendants’ own admission into a roadmap for liability across every remaining claim. The opening line sets the tone: “Defendants’ Reply does not defend Officer Osteen. It convicts him.” That the sur-reply opens with that level of confidence is notable — but that it was filed with the defense’s advance knowledge and without opposition is extraordinary. Giles and his team at Lewis Brisbois received the proposed sur-reply via email before it was filed with the court. They read what was coming. And they chose not to fight it.

The Admission That Changed Everything

As WTP News reported yesterday, defendants attempted to argue that Osteen did not suppress exculpatory evidence because he stated on camera that he didn’t smell alcohol. But as the sur-reply methodically demonstrates, that argument is self-defeating. The logic is devastating in its simplicity: if Osteen knew he didn’t smell alcohol — as his own attorneys now concede — then swearing in a warrant affidavit that he detected a “moderate” odor of alcohol on the breath was not a mistake. It was fabrication.

“Recording the truth on video while swearing the opposite in a court document is not disclosure. It is concealment.”

The sur-reply cites Brady v. Maryland (1963), Napue v. Illinois (1959), Giglio v. United States (1972), and Armstrong v. Ashley (5th Cir. 2023) — a wall of precedent establishing that officers who knowingly include false information in sworn documents violate clearly established constitutional rights.

The Observation Reversal Table

Perhaps the most powerful element of the sur-reply is a systematic comparison of every material observation in Osteen’s warrant affidavit against his own subsequent sworn testimony. The pattern is damning:

Observation	Warrant Affidavit (Sworn)	Osteen’s Sworn Testimony	Clinical Significance
Pupils	“Dilated”	“Pinpoint, very small”	Depressant indicator → stimulant indicator (opposite presentations)
Speech	“Slurred,” thick-tongued	“Talking extremely fast”	CNS depression → stimulant excitation
Gait	“Heavy-footed”	“Extremely jittery”	Motor depression → motor excitation
Odor	“Moderate” alcohol odor on breath	Stated on camera he could not smell alcohol — now conceded by defendants at Dkt. 79, ¶ 14	Fabricated observation (defendants’ own admission)

As the sur-reply argues: “These observations did not drift in random directions. Every one shifted — in the same direction — from depressant indicators to stimulant indicators, and only after the zero-BAC result eliminated the alcohol theory.” A systematic, unidirectional reversal of every material observation is the signature of fabrication, not honest recollection. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

The Perjury That Followed

The sur-reply doesn’t stop at the affidavit. It traces what it calls a “three-part sequence: fabrication, suppression, and perjury.” At Reardon’s Mississippi probation revocation hearing — after the state laboratory confirmed zero alcohol in his blood — Osteen testified under oath, twice, that “alcohol was detected” in the plaintiff’s blood. He possessed the zero-BAC result. He testified to the opposite.

“An officer who states one thing on camera, swears the opposite under penalty of perjury, and testifies to the opposite a third time is not making mistakes. That is fabrication, sustained across three forums.”

The Methamphetamine Timeline Problem

Defendants have repeatedly pointed to a methamphetamine lab result as the case’s silver bullet. The sur-reply dismantles this argument with a simple chronological fact that defendants have never addressed:

• December 7, 2023: Grand jury returns felony DWI indictment.
• February 1, 2024: Methamphetamine result issued — 56 days after the indictment.

“Evidence that did not exist when the indictment was returned cannot retroactively validate it,” the sur-reply argues. This creates what the filing calls a “dilemma for Defendants”: either the grand jury was told blood testing confirmed an intoxicant (which was false), or the zero-BAC result was withheld entirely. Either scenario defeats the independent intermediary doctrine.

Klein v. Martin Doesn’t Apply Here

Defendants introduced a new Supreme Court case in their reply — Klein v. Martin, 146 S. Ct. 589 (2026) — arguing that the zero-BAC result was not “material” under Brady. The sur-reply exposes a fundamental category error. Klein analyzes “verdict-based materiality” — asking whether suppressed evidence “undermines confidence in the verdict.” But there was no verdict in this case. There was no trial. There should not have been an indictment. The sur-reply also dispatches the Ninth Circuit’s Bradford v. Vang (2026) on the same grounds: its three-part test applies to “a convicted defendant,” which Reardon is not — his charges were dismissed.

Qualified Immunity: Dead on Arrival

The sur-reply devotes an entire section to why qualified immunity cannot survive the ¶ 14 admission. The argument is straightforward: qualified immunity shields officers who make reasonable mistakes. It does not shield officers who include deliberate falsehoods in warrant affidavits.

“There is no objectively reasonable reading of an officer who states the truth on camera and then records the opposite in a sworn document.”

Three foundational rules — Franks (1978), Brady (1963), and Napue (1959) — have been settled law for over six decades. “No reasonable officer could claim ignorance of rights established over the past six decades,” the sur-reply states.

First Amendment and Excessive Force Claims Strengthened

The filing also argues that the ¶ 14 admission strengthens the remaining claims: First Amendment retaliation: Osteen’s bodycam captures him identifying Reardon as an “auditor” — the terminology of journalists and accountability advocates. Having identified him as such, Osteen fabricated intoxication indicators he knew were false, withheld exculpatory evidence, and testified falsely to sustain the prosecution. Under Nieves v. Bartlett (2019), fabricating evidence after identifying a subject as a journalist is not “ordinary course” for any officer — it is objective evidence of retaliatory motive. Excessive force and unreasonable search: A compelled blood draw is a significant Fourth Amendment intrusion. If the warrant was void — because the affidavit’s central observation was known to be false — there was no lawful authority for the blood draw at all.

Galveston Defense Attorneys Declined to Oppose — Before the Filing

Perhaps the most telling detail is what happened before the sur-reply was filed. When plaintiff served defendants via email with the motion for leave and the proposed sur-reply, defense counsel Norman Ray Giles — Partner and Vice Chair of the Civil Rights & Police Defense Litigation Practice at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, representing the City of Galveston, Officer Osteen, and Sergeant Doraty — responded promptly: “You are welcome to include in your motion that my clients do not oppose your motion to file a sur-reply.” That is not a routine courtesy. Defense attorneys had every procedural right to oppose the motion. Sur-replies are disfavored in federal practice; courts regularly deny them. A simple objection could have kept this brief out of the record entirely. Instead, Galveston’s attorneys — after reviewing the proposed filing — affirmatively invited its inclusion, signaling, at minimum, that they saw no viable path to keep this argument from the court. Plaintiff also extended a professional courtesy to defense counsel, offering the City of Galveston, Officer Osteen, and Sergeant Doraty the opportunity to provide a statement in their own words for publication. “A filing can only convey so much,” the plaintiff wrote, “and if you would like to add your clients’ perspective, I will publish your statement accurately and in full and will correct any factual error you identify.” The offer carried no deadline and no obligation to respond. The non-opposition also carries a strategic implication: by declining to contest the motion, defendants forfeited their last opportunity to respond to the sur-reply’s arguments. The ¶ 14 admission, the observation reversal table, the perjury timeline, and the methamphetamine chronology will now stand as the final word in the briefing on the motion to dismiss.

What Happens Next

With defendants’ non-opposition, the court is expected to grant the motion for leave to file the sur-reply, which will enter it into the record as the final briefing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss remains pending before Judge Andrew M. Edison. The sur-reply concludes with a devastating summary: “Defendants came to this Court to defend a motion to dismiss. They leave having admitted its core liability fact.” All filings are available via PACER (Case No. 3:25-CV-203, S.D. Tex., Galveston Division). Matthew Oliver Reardon is a journalist and First Amendment advocate. Follow developments at wtpnews.org.

Related Coverage

• Galveston Defendants’ Own Reply Brief Concedes Officer Knew Alcohol Narrative Was False
• Galveston Federal Lawsuit Enters Critical Phase as Defendants Move to Dismiss
• Galveston Staged Arrest Sparks Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit
• The Busby Files: Perjury, Fraud Upon the Court & Obstruction of Justice

Related Coverage

• Reardon Files Objections to Magistrate’s Recommendation in Galveston Federal Civil Rights Suit
• Docket Update: Entry #89 Filed in Reardon v. Osteen et al. (2026-07-06)
• BREAKING: Marine Veteran Files Emergency Federal Motions After Galveston Seizes Second Vehicle — Asks Judge to Intervene Immediately

Legal & Records References

• Mississippi Public Records Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-1 et seq.
• U.S. Const. amend. I — First Amendment (Cornell LII)